
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS ON UNIVERSITY GOVERNANCE MODELS

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ABSTRACT

It is matter of consideration that governance of universities is an exceedingly intricate matter with no clear theory being generally accepted as a basis for approaching policy (Carnegie Commission of Higher Education, 1973). In 1970s the proper distribution of power and authority among administrators, faculty, students etc was crucial issue in governance as Gunne & Mortimer (1975) pointed out. The initial studies on universities aspired to explore the style of the decision-making process within the sphere of academic organization, then followed studies on the 'collegial' (Goodman, 1962) 'bureaucratic' (Blau, 1973), 'political' (Baldrige, 1971), and 'organized anarchy' (Cohen, et.al., 1974). Later on the alternative models were designed to construct the organization of the universities (Mignot-Gerard, 2010). However, the different models of governance being practiced in different universities are the bureaucratic, collegial and political, as well as the shared (Gmelch, 2003). Many models are proposed and supported, but the fact of the matter is that there is no one clearly accepted approach. As a matter of fact, there is no general model of governance (Fish, 2007).

Keywords: Governance, Bureaucratic, Political, Shared Governance, Collegial

INTRODUCTION

The institutions work best when governance is seen as partnership when a common sense of purpose brings harmonious relationships (Shattock, 2002). In 1966, the AAUP (American Association of University Professors) and the AGB (Association of Governing Boards), along with the ACE (American Council on Education) recognized the interdependence of trustees, faculty, and administrators. Later, in 1998, Association of Governing Boards governing board responsible for the institution.

Gayle, *et.al.*, (2011) mention that it was in 1999, writers perceived if the faculty is eroded the decision making process is affected in universities. It was thus, felt and suggested that in the mainstream of colleges and universities faculty participation is accepted necessary by and large because of their position to govern the affairs well (Birnbaum, 1991) for the reason that faculty members are nucleus of university governance (Birnbaum, 1991; Moodie & Eustace, 1974; Gerber, 2014). Thus, the faculty participation is important in the decision making process. Shattock (2002) also suggests that without taking academic colleagues in decision making the satisfactory implementation will not be ensured. However, the role of faculty becomes

important if the universities are to steer ahead with the orientation of the desired goals.

Simplicio (2006) in terms of distribution of power between administration and faculty raised also some debatable questions for example, should critical decisions making be a mutual collaboration of faculty and administration both? It is imperative whether faculty and administration with equal power in decision making should affect the future of institution? In whom the power be invested regarding important decisions that can ensure the sustainability of university in future? The only answer is that it is for faculty members and administrators to decide that who would take active part because being live on campus they best understand the campus interplay of life that may provide best possible prospects to steer to academic goals because administrators are not expected to take decisions in a vacuum.

It has been noted that the meaning given to the governance has been still vastened which has further excessively enhanced its spectrum thus having different genealogy. It is also viewed that governance means different modes of coordinating individual actions (Mayntz, 2003). Correspondingly, bureaucratic, collegial and political as well as shared are the different models of governance being practiced in different universities (Gmelch, 2003).

BUREAUCRATIC MODEL

According to Max Weber, bureaucracies are networks of social groups within stipulated objectives established for maximum efficiency and regulated according to the principal of “legal rationality”. They are hierarchical and coherent by formal chain of command and a system of communication, along with many others (Neumann, 1983). The bureaucracy comprises elements like the period of holding a post, appointment to the post, suitable salary and competency criterion laid down for promotion (Baldrige, 1971). Angiello (1997) calls Weber the leading bureaucratic theorist. Angiello further argues that Weber’s theory of bureaucracy was undoubtedly influenced by both his background and by the milieu in which he developed his concepts.

Bureaucracy, in general, implies complex organizations. Failure in certain areas, like no rigid rules to check blundering officials, slow operation, ambiguous directives, duplication, and control in few hands, makes the organization ineffective. That may be a problem for all – faculty, administrators, students, and external constituencies (Waugh, 2003). It is fruitful to study university governance, including competence criteria for appointment, fixed salaries paid by organization, rank respected, career-concerned lifestyle, organization-centered security, and separation of personal property from the organization. Bureaucracy is an authoritative form of governance (Stroup, 1966; Angiello, 1997).

The bureaucratic model is a top-down approach that bases the greatest proportion of institutional power at the top, with each descending organizational leader receiving less and less power and decision-making ability (Gmelch, 2003; Garrison, 2010). Perrow (1979) finds it unresponsive, inflexible, and inefficient. Bennis (1969) also criticizes bureaucracy because he says it does not adequately allow for personal growth and development. Clark (1964) finds it to be a system of formal channels, through which responsibility is predetermined to a certain position, and interaction between executives and subordinates, and decisions made are on the basis of relative rules. Although this model is in practice, according to McCauley (2002), in collective bargaining institutions, it has increased student social issues. Perhaps the main reason for this is traditional procedures adopted without innovation in respect of the changing human global phenomenon.

Baldrige, *et.al.*, (1974) points out that the processes of bureaucracy do not match with academic organizations in respect of policy making, professional teaching and research. He has sorted out the characteristics as (a) clear goals less disagreement (b) material processing commercial (c) clearer re-utilized segmented (d) predominantly non-professional (e) less vulnerable because bureaucracy is rigid and academic organizations are more fluid. Bureaucracy implies command, whereas professional employees demand autonomy at work. According to Baldrige (1971), the bureaucratic model is about authority pertaining to legal conventional power. Bureaucracy is a cohesive organization, whereas academic organizations are fragmented, with ambiguous and fragmented goals. Baldrige agrees with Cohen, *et al.* (1974) in calling the university an “organized anarchy” that consequently differs from a well-organized bureaucracy.

In brief, there are the following reservations about the bureaucratic model of governance: it is more about legitimate formal power. It is for formal structure not for process that gives it dynamism. It has no alternate for the change needed from time to time. It says little about the critical policy establishment process. It even ignores political issues like group interests within the university (Baldrige, 1971). In bureaucratic institutions, administrators hold entire control, leaving little room for faculty and departmental autonomy (Gayle, *et.al.*, 2003).

POLITICAL MODEL

According to Baldrige, political theories “stand on interest groups, conflict, values, power and influence, negotiating and bargaining concepts are salient features of political theories, therefore, instead of bureaucratic process the university governance embrace political process” (Baldrige, 1971; Sufean & Asimiran, 2010).

A university is neither entirely a bureaucracy nor collegiums. It is a team made of individuals and, as a natural phenomenon, conflicts and values differ among them. Since people influence informal processes for policy formulation, they are key variables. There is always political strife in universities (Gayle, *et.al.*, 2003). Bureaucracy refers to organizational structures like authority, role, procedures, etc. Structures must be defined in a broader sense than bureaucratic limits. For flawless functioning, structures can be deliberated and implemented in the governance process to improve effectiveness and attain an ideal working environment (Kezar & Eckel, 2004; Sufean & Asimiran, 2010).

As in decision making, conflicts are inevitable and may be regarded as an indulgence of diverse groups that happen to be politically motivated. The political model presumes that in complex organizations, the conflict of interest groups in the university make a political system on smaller scale (Baldrige, *et.al.*, 1977). This model deals with colleges or universities as they are perceived to be, not as people feel they should be (Richardson, 1975). No question is found about the value of the political model as an agent for change and for the resolution of conflict. Less assurance can be expressed concerning the usefulness of the political model in conserving the values of the collegiums (Angiello, 1997).

This model had been developed under the belief that the political dynamics of decision making would help in studying the difficulties involved in university administration because conflicts are natural in a dynamic organization. There are many power groups in the university that are expected to influence their values. Small groups of the political elite govern most major decisions. Since decisions are divided with different elite groups, small groups do not govern everything. Besides elite control, there is a democratic tendency in universities. Junior faculty and students raise their voices for decision making. This current of democratization needs to be promoted rather than suppressed. Decisions are taken after negotiation with competing groups, not by issuing orders from the bureaucracy. Viable compromises need to be jockeyed between interest groups. Internal groups cannot make policies, ignoring the external groups who are influenced by them in the university (Baldrige, 1971).

The political model is an attempt to sort out the best of the bureaucratic and collegial models and bring them together into a working paradigm. The key is an understanding that the university is a “dynamic” organization, constantly changing and requiring different methods of decision making and governance (Baldrige, 1971).

There are representatives from faculty, students, government associations, alumni, boards and executive administration in the political model. Each group sends delegates to sit on what might be called a university

council, which shares a majority for institutional power and decision-making ability (Garrison, 2010).

Thus, all the stake holders are taken on board to make decisions that may affect the university's performance. According to Richardson (1975), this model is based on a shifting coalition of power blocks and vested interest in the institution. Favoring the concept of this model, McCauley (2002) argues that the "governing body's power emanates not from the institutional boards but from special operating within a social context."

Its theoretical foundations are based on conflict, interest groups, open systems and community power theories. Its social structure is pluralistic. Decisions are made through negotiation, bargaining and political influence. Its emphasis is on formulation rather than execution.

COLLEGIAL MODEL

A collegiums or community of scholars is philosophically based on self-governance with little or no interference from government. It is presupposed that taking decisions is a joint venture between faculty and administrators; hence it is termed a traditional academic model (Gmelch, 2003). Baldrige (1971) sees three different aspects: collegial university management, faculty professional authority, and utopian perception (how the professional process should operate). Further, he says it is the concept of a community of scholars to administer its own affairs, exclusive of the bureaucracy. Since, the university is a generalization of interpersonal behaviour, the concept of community specialization must be brought together through dynamic consensus instead of super ordination or subordination. Instead of rigid hierarchy and authority, professionalization of the academic community needs a company of equals. This concerns the alienation of the educational process, with hundreds showing their resentment through revolt, because students and the educational establishment call for a return to academic community.

According to Bess, the concept of collegiality has many meanings: for some, it is a set of norms and values making up the academic culture; for others, it is a structure of decision making; and for still others, it is a pattern of interaction among faculty and administration (Angiello, 1997). Richardson (1975) calls collegiums a practical model of how a college or university really functions; but this leaves a number of important questions unanswered. As a statement of the aspirations of those who work within a college and those who receive its services, the concept is indispensable. On the other hand, in the opinion of those practically involved in management of the collegial university affairs are for full participation of academic community, rather than bureaucracy (Baldrige, 1971).

Thus, the collegial model is for a professional community. Theoretically, human relations are approached through professionalism. Conflicts are satisfied with the efforts of a united community of scholars. Decision making is shared. There is more emphasis on formulation. However, Baldrige (1971), referring to Paul Goodman's community of scholars, objects that he needed more insight into professional contacts between the relevant courses of educational innovation, stressing faculty and student reciprocal action. Again, Millett (1978) calls this model dynamic yet it fails to address the issues; descriptive and nominative enterprises are often confused. Do they say a university is collegiums or ought to be collegiums? It is not the present-day perception or a lament for paradise lost (Baldrige, 1971).

According to Baldrige (1971), Millet observes a failure of consensus in that even after prolonged discourse, decisions are not consensual. This is due to the supremacy of one group over the other. It simply occurs that bureaucratic procedure does not address the process of decision making. Basically, the proponents of the collegiums model are averse to the bureaucratic model.

CORPORATE MODEL

In the 1980s, the Jarratt Report influenced the shifting of local authority control reforms in the corporate governance of business, which played the role of affecting the development of governance in higher education. Shattock (2006) has traced out that following the Maxwell Scandal, the Cadbury Report, 1992 served as a model for modern regulations on corporate governance. Its code recommended: separation of the chairman and chief executive's role to avoid a single individual having unfettered power of decision. There is a need to appoint a non-executive director with sufficient weight in the board's decision-making process for independent judgment regarding planning, efficiency to act, expediency, and the model management.

Cadbury was followed by the Greenbury Report, 1995 and Hampel, 1998 endorsed both with some cautionary words. The people, teamwork, leadership, enterprise, experience and skill joint venture become advantageous effort. There is no such method to amalgamate them in one. It would be risky to believe that rules and regulations will ensure success. Five years later, Hampel wrote: for me corporate governance is becoming over complicated to risk stultifying business. Rules will not prevent deliberate fraud so we must ensure sensible balance (Shattock, 2006). However, corporate governance improved in 1998 and, further, the most important analogy is accountability in the corporate world. It concentrates on the conduct of business at the governing body level, at lower levels of

governance where academics and the others are involved. However, regarding corporate governance regulations, the OECD, 1998 had reservations.

This model stated “specific governance structures or practices will not necessarily fit all companies at all times. For dynamic enterprises operating in a rapidly changing world; corporate adoptability and flexibility supported by regulatory frame work is prerequisite for better corporate performance.” Corporate governance failure led to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, 2002, but again this created substantial bureaucracy. In higher education, the induction of lay members into governing bodies caused wastage of time. The governance thus appeared to comprise technical issues handled by specialists. The secretary behaved as a bureaucratic master, rather than a guide (Shattock, 2006), the process of taking a decision was preferred to substance or the decision-making structure. Even audit committees proved ineffective in serious governance issues.

ACADEMIC MODEL

Academic governance in higher education occurs lower down in the organization. The overall performance of the institution is determined by what happens in the academic departments (Shattock, 2006). In the 1950s and 1960s, Sir Eric (later Lord) Ashby, vice chancellor of the Queen’s University Belfast, a distinguished scientist and leading scholar, stood up for the role of academics in university affairs. According to Ashby, “policy making begins in a healthy university at any rates at the level of departments among the teaching staff”. Conflicting proposals are considered and reconciled there and the senate reconciles from the faculty. After filtering through committees, issues finally reach the council – the formal sovereignty.

Further, Shattock (2006) wrote, if the university becomes an institution managed by an oligarchy instead of a society managed by its members, it will fail to survive. Thus, for Shattock, the academics were to consider important issues at their level and reconcile them through the faculty for onward transmission to the council in decision making. He pointed out that some university councils would not act in academic matters unless the senate recommended it. In his opinion, if a man from another area happens to be in charge of university affairs, this would consume huge amount of stamina to persuade different forums to get his ideas translated in administrative action (if he had any ideas at all).

Shattock’s views provided the framework for the academic system of governance. However, his ideas did get free flow, even if they invited a series of reservations. He overlooked the democratization movements that were in the offing. A decade later, Moodie and Eustace (1974), in their

discussion of academic decision making, uncovered its mixed and discordant picture.

In 1982, Durham noted that he found “higher education institutions without organizational structure and management skills to deal with few years later situation.” However, there was also a positive picture. As Salford-like universities coped with budget cut problems and survived as viable and effective institutions, the Salford vice chancellor maintained a strong organizational culture. As Sizer (1988) mentioned, universities coped pretty well, despite an unprecedented reduction in income. On the other hand, Middlehurst (2004), though disagreeing with Tapper and Salter’s (1992) argument about the Oxbridge model that such universal values of autonomy and donnish domination are not exceptional with Oxbridge, agrees with them that academic freedom is a precondition for the disinterested search for knowledge as the values on which society depends. Whereas, the purpose of academic authority being supreme was to achieve the consensus of Ashby, it aimed at the formulation of systematic procedures, clear judgment and thorough consultation to be undertaken (Middlehurst, 2004).

To counter this slow process of decision making, Salter and Tapper (1992) suggest rationally participated governance with a constant and stable funding environment. Middlehurst (2004), drawing on Salter and Tapper, has mentioned the trends that undermined the liberal ideal: government’s awareness of the economic value of higher education in an internationally competitive knowledge society, and government’s steering and evaluation role. Marketization and consumer choice will drive up standards. A revival of the Oxbridge model is socially decisive.

Middlehurst (2004) has cited the watch words “Increase efficiency, find new sources of income and improve performance on ever widening range of services,” as the messages of the reports and white papers published over two decades. The dynamics of university management have changed since 1980 due to expansions in the number of students, financial stringency, abolition of the binary line, and reliance on overseas student fees. The government required aligning with the external environment and a control perspective. According to Taggart (2004), due to the global economy, universities have become key institutions in the survival of the state.

Previously, it was government’s role to provide for the universities; it is now the role of universities to provide for the purpose of government’s councils and senates that were less equipped, lacked expertise, met too infrequently, and were too large to make critical decisions, and demanded decision making machinery capable of responding (Taggart, 2004). Pre-1992, the senate was dominated by its standing committees, which “pre-digested most of the important business”, and was inclined to rubber stamp the recommendations of most of the other bodies whose voluminous papers were

served to senate. Only the most dedicated would skim, let alone read, them all (Pullen, 2004). As such, senates approve the decisions mostly taken elsewhere. Even vice chancellors were obliged to compensate with the senate (or academic board) for fear of a vote of no confidence, lest they lose their job. As such, as proposed by Ashby, the idea of consensus was at stake. In the HEC (Higher Education Commission) constitution, the role of chief executive is clearly defined and the academic board has a more limited role in institutional governance.

There was no wholesale move to the chief executive style, but vice chancellors operated through small groups or committees in indirect patterns. Again, vice chancellors were seen conducting Monday morning meetings with regulators and members, and formally reporting back requirements to the senate (Bargh, *et.al.*, 2000). Smith (1999) has mentioned such university management groups (UMG) as comprising academic officers, elected deans and senior administration. He has described them as a “strengthened steering core”, a pathway to the transformation of universities from being autonomous. According to Pullen (2004), they gather the ability to speed up decision making, legitimated by senate directly to communicate with the governing board if required. This created a top-down structure with the deans outside, who needed a separate deans’ committee on academic policy issues. Consequently, the very concept of Ashby’s liberal ideal was hardly sustained in the university governance.

SHARED GOVERNANCE MODEL

In 1966, the AAUP’s (American Association of University Professors) statement of government of colleges and universities promoted the idea of shared responsibility and cooperative action of board, administrators, faculty and students and the internal stakeholders of higher education (Lanning, 2006). The concept was proposed for the first time by President Henry P. Tappan of the University of Michigan for the faculty to enjoy sovereignty, because it is only the entity of scholars who can build universities on a sound footing basis (Birnbaum, 2004). The joint statement of AAUP, 1966, ACE (American Council of Education) and AGB (American Governing Boards) laid down two principles: one, that institutional components should take part and the second regarding the responsibility of each component. Every voice should be responded to for any matter in discussion (Lanning, 2006).

AAUP (1966) suggested that institutions avail themselves of the context that suits their particular culture, and create a definition within that culture (Baker-Brown, 2011). There is a host of competitive explanations regarding shared governance ranging from campus to campus as well as within the institutions (Tierney, 2004). Lanning (2006) finds common themes that emerge in most definitions; for example, words like collaboration,

mutuality, participation, responsibility and advisory can be found as a theme in almost all the definitions. He further sees shared governance as participation by constituencies; administrators, staff, faculty, students, employees, senates and unions can be the constituency of the governance board.

According to Hartley, M. (2002), in colleges and universities there is a division of labor as each group has different constituencies and roles. In the governance system, participation of all the constituencies is a requirement. They have certain shared norms, values and briefs. As such, broad-based decision making produces ideas to the prevailing ethos, identity and mission. In this way, consensus is promoted for a particular idea, a strategy to generate plurality for multiple constituencies who work to advance the idea and ensures it success that balances institutional and constituent interest, procedural justice and trust, which stand for the structures of shared governance. With such commitment, universities can engage students, faculty and staff to create the future dramatically. By dint of shared governance, universities maintain their status, both as old organizations, as well as future-oriented institutions (Kaplan, 2004; Heaney, 2010).

However, shared governance provides structure and processes for agreeable decisions based on the acceptance of various parties (Eckel, 1999), which creates a mechanism that allocates the power of internal stake holders. This results in more favorable outcomes and larger scale participation in the process of decision making by involving all the bodies and stakeholders in the structures and processes that are composed among faculty, administrators and other stakeholders' joint effort for collective decisions in the system (Eckel, 1999; Garrison, 2010).

From time to time, certain models, ranging from Oxbridge to bureaucratic, have been produced as governance models that reflect authoritarianism. The collegial model advocates self-governance in which there is little or even no interference from government and the interests of stakeholders. It is for mutual participation of the community of scholars in respect of decisions affecting the constituencies. Corporate model: for the particular governance structures or practices that may hardly suit all the companies at all times. Academic model: involving the academic community in decision making. In the political model, there is constant conflict among trustees, administrators, faculty and students who have competing interests (Lanning, 2006; Baker-Brown, 2011). In the political model, power emanates from interest groups (McCauley, 2002).

In order to attain harmony, in shared governance, structures and processes are invented by academic institutions to achieve effective balance between legal authority and professional authority because it was founded on two principles: the nature of the professions and the protection of academic

freedom (Ramo, 1997). This is more analogous theoretically to the collegial model as both approach human relationships through professionalism and the true community of scholars that provides a chance of shared decision making.

CONCLUSION

The practice of setting different models of governance has made university structures complicated as to who may be entrusted to carry through governance processes in the capacity of stakeholder. For example, there is the bureaucratic model, which is for the concentration of institutional power at the top of the hierarchy, gradually descending from the top to the lower level of organizational leaders, distributing less and less power, as well as decision-making ability (Garrison, 2010). This model is termed the top-down approach. Baldrige, *et.al.*, (1974) are against this on the pretext that it is a rigid form of organization. As against that, it is an admitted fact that academic organizations are fluid/ flexible, so this model cannot fit them. Secondly, bureaucracy works through command, which is binding on the employees, whereas professional employees need autonomy in their work.

Weber is criticized by Angiello (1997) for being a leading bureaucratic theorist because, on the one hand, he is influenced by his bureaucratic background and, on other hand the milieu played a role in developing his concept in this regard. Secondly, the term bureaucracy is generally implied to complex organizations that are reluctant to allocate responsibility clearly. The hard-and-fast rules of bureaucracy, along with specific cases of blundering officials, slow the process of operation, and buck-passing of conflicting directions and duplication of efforts hinder allocation of responsibility to work effectively and efficiently (Bendix & Roth, 1971; Angiello, 1997).

The bureaucratic model is a top-down approach that assigns the greatest portion of institutional power to those at the helm of affairs, descending to the lower levels with lesser power in the policy making (Garrison, 2010). Perrow *et.al.*, (1986) call it unresponsive, inflexible and inefficient. Bennis (1989, 1969) also criticizes that, in this model, adequate personal growth and development is not allowed because, in such institutions, administrators dominate over all, faculty and departmental autonomy is overlapped, and the cultural and administrative conflicts between faculty and staff will increase (Gayle, *et.al.*, 2003; Waugh, 2003).

Another model was suggested based on the political concept. It is designed on the pattern of political approach used in the dynamic decision-making process and is suggested to help constraints regarding university governance. The political theories take birth from the designs of interest group conflicts, variation of values, power and influences settled by negotiation and bargain (Baldrige, 1971). On this basis, Baldrige wants the

universities to adopt a political process instead of a bureaucratic process that is designed to work through bureaucratic mechanisms (Sufean & Asimiran, 2010). In the opinion of Kezar and Eckel (2004), the structural form of governance process is made to address the issues of improvement and effectiveness in order to guarantee the ultimate functioning of the university.

As a matter of fact, a university is neither a bureaucracy nor a collegiums entity. There exists an exercise of teamwork of individuals and, naturally, differences of values and conflicts exist among them. There exists key variable persons who influence informal process that play a critical role in the policy making process. Even political contest usually occurs in the universities (Gayle, *et.al.*, 2011).

The collegiums model or community of scholars is philosophically based on self-governance (Baldrige, 1971). The community of scholars is supposed to manage the administration of matters on their own. This model gives a free hand to colleges and universities to work practically (Richardson, 1975). To Bess, the concept of collegiality has many meanings: some call it a set of norms shaping the academic culture, others call it a decision-making structure, and some call it a pattern of interaction among faculty and administration (Angiello, 1997).

The corporate model is about the way power is exercised over corporate entities (Tricker, 2015). These governance structures or practices do not address all the issues of companies at all times. A point of concern is that even in the academic model, the academic community is involved in the decision-making process (Lanning, 2006; Kaplan, 2004; Piland & Bublitz, 1998). Though one can trace out its similarity with shared governance to some extent, yet the shared governance model stands exclusively for participatory decision making (Lanning, 2006; Tierney & Minor, 2003).

The same idea is promoted by the Loyola University Chicago report (2002), which states that because all the individuals are essential to the governance of an institution, everyone needs to expedite in the smooth running of universities. The same view is reflected by Baker-Brown (2011), who argues that to operate the universities as a democracy, the administration, faculty and governing voice of all parties should be allowed to participate in the process of decision making. In many countries, the formal powers of university leaders and managers have increased at the expense of more collegial or participative modes of governance (Eurydice, 2008).

This analysis demonstrates that every model has a peculiar perception and hence each model has a distinguishing perception (Gayle et al. 2003). Each governance model has a different purpose and context at different periods of time and is useful in understanding governance (Gmelch, 2003). The goodness of a model lies in the abstract that how it applied in certain

cases. Therefore, the effectiveness of a model can only be prospective when those who device out and those who live accordingly. It is general assumption that most traditional model of university governance should be governed by their academic staff (faculty) (Trakman, 2008).

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